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It is 11 p.m. in the hospital and the lone
neurology resident has just been called in
on a case—a woman had found her 40-
year-old husband unresponsive on the
floor in their living room, after she heard
a loud thud. When she ran to see what
happened and saw her husband lying
motionless, she immediately called 911.
She frantically administered chest com-
pressions and forced breaths until the
paramedics arrived and took over resusci-
tation efforts. After detecting a pulse but
almost no blood pressure, they delivered a
large bolus of fluids intravenously and
inserted an endotracheal tube to ventilate
the man’s lungs.
In the emergency department, the
intake team initiates a workup, including
blood electrolytes, arterial blood gases,
cardiac enzymes, urine toxicology, cardiac
telemetry, and computed tomography
brain scan, to determine the cause of the
patient’s poor responsiveness. With many
questions unanswered, the patient is trans-
ferred to the intensive care unit and closely
monitored.
The distraught family peppers the
neurology resident with questions:
Will he make it through this? What are
his chances? When will he wake up? Can
he understand us? Will he be normal? Is
he alive?
In this unfortunate scenario, repeated
daily across hospitals around the world,
neurologists try to provide the family with
an accurate prognosis or, at least, mean-
ingful guidance. In evaluating patients
with impaired consciousness, the neurolo-
gist assesses the history, the imaging, the
laboratory values, and, most importantly,
a hands-on examination that interrogates
brain function [1]. Ideally, these questions
about prognosis and consciousness would
be answered in the acute setting, however,
it remains difficult to provide answers even
after much deliberation over ensuing days,
weeks, or even months. Despite best
efforts, nearly 40% of consciousness disor-
ders are misdiagnosed [2]. In the setting of
such inaccuracy, the possibility of applying
new technology toward this problem is
clearly enticing. Some have proposed that
functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) might allow physicians to ‘‘look
inside the brain’’ to identify conscious
brain function. Recently, a group of
researchers has successfully applied fMRI
to identify consciousness in brain-damaged
individuals and, in one case, to communi-
cate with the patient.
Here, we discuss the clinical applicabil-
ity of fMRI for examining disorders of
consciousness, and, though we will high-
light multiple limitations in its current state
that severely restrict clinical application,
the approach has yielded results that have
gained broader attention from physicians
and patient advocates. Future research
and methods development are needed
before fMRI can be widely applied in
the setting of chronically altered con-
sciousness. Even more work is needed
before fMRI can be extended to the acute
setting portrayed in the scenario above,
despite an urgent and pervasive need in
clinical neurology for such tools.
Uncertainty in identifying the level of
consciousness and in predicting outcome
in brain-damaged patients compounds the
difficulty for doctors and families as they
attempt to make gut-wrenching decisions
about the futility of a particular interven-
tion or about withholding further life-
sustaining interventions. Neurologists have
long sought improved insight into whether
or not an individual is conscious and tools
are needed for communicating with such
individuals. Thus, recent high-profile find-
ings using fMRI have led to widespread
interest in near-term application of this
technology in the clinical arena, where
patients thought to be without conscious-
ness or ability to communicate would be
scanned with fMRI to identify brain
activation consistent with consciousness.
Further, these findings have raised hope
that volitional control of brain activation
might provide a means by which such
patients could communicate their wishes.
Coma (from the Greek ‘‘koma/koma,’’
meaning deep sleep) is a profound state of
unconsciousness. Coma patients cannot be
awakened, fail to respond normally to
pain, light, or sound, do not have sleep–
wake cycles, and do not take voluntary
actions. Coma may result from a variety of
conditions, including intoxication, meta-
bolic abnormalities, central nervous sys-
tem infections, stroke, and hypoxia from
cardiac arrest, or from head trauma
sustained in falls or car accidents.
Neurologists attempt to quantify the
level of coma before deciding on a
prognosis. Comas generally last a few days
to a few weeks, and rarely more than two
to five weeks. Some have lasted several
years, after which patients may gradually
emerge from the coma, remain in a
minimally conscious state [3], progress to
a vegetative state [4], or die. Patients in a
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coma, but presumably have not regained
awareness. Patients in a minimally con-
scious state, unlike those in a vegetative
state, exhibit behaviors associated with
conscious awareness, although inconsis-
tently. People may emerge from a coma
with a combination of physical, intellectu-
al, and psychological impairments. Some
patients never progress beyond very basic
responses, but many recover full aware-
ness. Recovery usually occurs slowly and
gradually.
Predicted chances of recovery are
variable owing to different techniques used
to measure the extent of neurological
damage. All such predictions are based
on statistical rates with some level of
chance for recovery present. Time is the
best general predictor; after four months of
coma caused by brain damage, the chance
of partial recovery is less than 15%, and
the chance of full recovery is even less.
Neurologists routinely use the Levy
criteria [1] to help prognosticate, with
percentage of recovery assigned to differ-
ent responses on neurological testing over
the first few days post-injury. In this
landmark study, presence or absence of
pupillary response to light, blink response
to corneal stimulation, and motor response
to pain recorded across the first days of
coma were linked to outcome percentages
in 310 patents with anoxic brain injury
studied over one year. No similar study
exists on such a scale, and so these
outcome numbers represent the neurolo-
gists’ best guess for outcome in the days
following a patient’s anoxic brain injury.
But without similar data informing prog-
nosis of other forms of brain injury such as
traumatic brain injury, the Levy criteria
are often inappropriately extended to
prognosticate in these other cases.
Technology has been used toassist in
assessing the health of the brain and its
likelihood of recovery in these situations.
Structural brain imaging can help identify
whether profound brain damage is pres-
ent, such as that resulting from a large
intracranial hemorrhage, infarction, or
tumor. Diffuse brain edema might suggest
that neural damage is extensive and
recovery is likely to be poor [5]. However,
every case is unique, and most neurologists
have stories of patients whose level of
recovery was astounding despite evidence
of widespread brain damage on structural
imaging.
Electroencephalography may comple-
ment structural imaging, as it allows some
exploration of the patient’s brain function.
By examining the injury’s disruption of
brain electrical rhythms, the physician can
gain further information about the extent
of brain injury and likelihood of patient
consciousness, but assessment of brain
rhythms does not greatly improve prog-
nostic accuracy, nor does it directly assess
consciousness. Electroencephalographic
evidence of brain response to sensory
nerve stimulation does appear to improve
prognostic accuracy [6]. Specifically, bi-
lateral absence of cortical evoked poten-
tials reliably predicts unfavorable outcome
in comatose patients after cardiac arrest
[7], but it, too, says little about the
presence or absence of consciousness.
Recently, a paper published in The New
England Journal of Medicine [8] reported that
imaging technology revealed conscious
intent in patients with brain injury. Using
fMRI, they showed evidence of willful
brain activation in five patients (out of 54
studied) in vegetative or minimally con-
scious states. Further, one patient with a
diagnosis of vegetative state was able to
correctly answer yes or no questions by
activating different areas of his brain
through visualization of different activities
while he was undergoing fMRI, despite
being unable to show any signs of
consciousness at the bedside.
Understandably, this report has gained
much attention from physicians and fam-
ilies caring for patients presumed to be
minimally conscious. Physicians at the
present authors’ institution, including the
present authors themselves, have been
approached by families to perform the test
as part of the evaluation of patients with
impaired consciousness from various etiol-
ogies. As such, it is worthwhile noting that
all five patients in the reported study who
were in a vegetative or minimally con-
scious state and were found to be respon-
sive on fMRI, had sustained traumatic
brain injury rather than anoxic brain
injury. This does not necessarily serve as
an effective argument against testing,
however, when the family is desperate
for an answer about their loved one.
How can one argue against looking for
subclinical signs of consciousness in pa-
tients when a technology for doing so
exists? No doubt- the idea is tantalizing,
and the authors are to be lauded for taking
on such a herculean task of performing
fMRI in this oft-neglected patient popula-
tion. Indeed, the challenges of performing
fMRI in patients are many and varied. But
the enthusiasm for wider application of the
authors’ methodology in the clinical realm
must be tempered, particularly when
considering the limitations of the technol-
ogy and the potential for misinterpretation
of results. The authors were not measuring
neural activity associated with conscious-
ness per se, but rather measuring neural
activity unlikely to be generated in the
setting of unconsciousness. In the end, the
neural activity was analogous to a lever the
patient could pull to communicate, and, if
the patient was not conscious, the brain
region would not activate; the lever would
not be pulled.
As with any test, the issues surrounding
false positives and false negatives are
important, but these issues are particularly
salient when considering wider use of this
procedure. Errors in either direction could
be harmful. An unconscious patient mis-
classified through fMRI as being conscious
might be subjected to inappropriately
aggressive or prolonged treatment. But
what about a conscious patient misclassi-
fied as unconscious? Going forward, it
seems that a treating physician should
assume that some level of consciousness
could exist, regardless of test outcome.
This is especially so in light of evidence for
fluctuations of consciousness, even in the
minimally conscious state. Such evidence
demands that negative test results would
be interpreted with great caution, espe-
cially before allowing it to influence care in
any way.
Though successful in this study and
perhaps the best of all current options, it is
hard to argue that fMRI is a technology
well-suited for this population. Even under
ideal circumstances, it is an extremely
poor communication device. The signal is
highly dependent on subject cooperation,
as artifacts due to subject motion disrupt
the images themselves, and subtle misun-
derstanding of task instructions can lead to
uninterpretable or misinterpretable data.
In this population, presentation of audito-
ry stimuli is fraught with additional
challenges. Unlike auditory fMRI studies
in the healthy population, which have
been performed successfully despite the
noisy scanning environment, here there is
no possibility of titrating sound level for
the individual and confirming that the
stimuli are audible to the patient.
Furthermore, the data must be reliable
in the individual patient. Most fMRI
experiments must pool activity across a
dozen or more subjects to obtain reliable
signal; however, the authors laid the
foundation for this study through extensive
prior work that showed the validity of their
approach in individuals [9]. Most of that
validation was performed in healthy sub-
jects with normal brain anatomy and
function, and it remains unclear whether
one can count on such reliability when the
technique is exported to centers without
the specific expertise of the study’s au-
thors. Optimal statistical thresholds for
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The present study selected the p,0.05
level with accepted correction for statisti-
cal comparisons across the whole brain.
Individual fMRI data is inherently noisy
and is especially so for tasks involving
higher-level cognitive function, as opposed
to primary sensory function. Scanners
outside the authors’ institutions will vary
in the signal-to-noise characteristics. The
authors’ validation studies, therefore,
might be less relevant to exporting the
technique to other centers, as the same
selected statistical threshold may yield
additional spurious activations that have
a chance of falling within the targeted
region of interest.
Nevertheless, the study demonstrates
the potential of using fMRI tasks, and
resulting brain activation, as an approach
to communicate with patients otherwise
unable to make their needs known. It
represents a creative use of the localized
activity pattern yielded by fMRI, com-
bined with reverse inference, to gauge the
processes taking place in the brain of a
patient. It is hard to deny that the findings
are indeed important. Excitement is usu-
ally the emotion that accompanies a new
and important finding, but in this case,
one is dismayed that patients presumed to
be with minimal consciousness might
instead meet a new definition of the
‘‘locked-in syndrome’’—conscious but un-
able to communicate even with simple
saccades or subtle blinks.
In fact, one would hope that the authors
were mistaken in concluding that no
alternative means of communication were
possible for the one responsive patient.
After all, one can never fully explore the
universe of behavioral communication
methods. Yet, the expertise of the authors
in this field suggests that the prior testing
was extensive, and, as such, the data
support a relatively dismal notion—that
cases exist where the only means of
detecting consciousness is by looking
inside the brain. Until now, all such
patients have missed detection. These
well-characterized individual patients,
and any others subsequently discovered,
would prove highly valuable for develop-
ing novel techniques for binary means of
communication beyond fMRI, which
could be used in MCS, PVS, and coma.
The authors no doubt exhausted the
accepted approaches used in clinical
neurology that explore for subtle eye,
tongue, or finger movements. Might
physicians and researchers with expertise
in using other biomarkers, such as galvanic
skin response, electrodiagnostic approach-
es, or a host of other procedures also find
success in communicating with such pa-
tients? Perhaps. Or perhaps all other
techniques outside of fMRI would fail,
but it seems important to test simpler
techniques against the new fMRI proce-
dure that presently is the gold standard in
these rare cases.
It is difficult to identify more than a few
direct health benefits of the many millions
of dollars invested by governments in
fMRI research, and it is increasingly
recognized that fMRI yields only a partial
picture of brain function. In fact, cognition
and consciousness are more distributed
processes than can be revealed by blobs on
an fMRI activation map. Advances are
needed before promoting the widespread
use of such technology to answer clinical
questions of coma and consciousness.
Developing robustness to motion and
other artifacts while improving signal-to-
noise for use in individual patients are
clear targets, but conceptual advance-
ments are also needed. The current focus
on localizing regional activity that corre-
lates with an isolated cognitive function
will likely be insufficient, and, the field
may benefit from more recent focus on
putative functional networks revealed
though inter-regionally correlated activity.
Such activity can be revealed even in the
absence of a task [10], which would
further improve the applicability in patient
populations poorly able to follow task
instructions, including the minimally con-
scious [11]. It remains to be seen,
however, whether these networks can be
reliably associated with levels of brain
function or presumed consciousness, or
even, perhaps, if they are simply an
epiphenomenon of thalamocortical rhy-
thms better characterized through electro-
encephalography. Nonetheless, fMRI re-
mains an extremely powerful tool for
exploring human brain function, as it is
able to reveal changes in regional blood
flow in response to regional neural activity
and does give ‘‘a look inside the brain,’’
albeit a limited one [12]. Advances are
expected to further improve clinical appli-
cability to individual patients. Given such
advances and despite the myriad challeng-
es to consistent application in the clinical
setting, fMRI using blood oxygen level–
dependent responses or other developing
approaches [13] might eventually serve to
help answer some of the most difficult
questions doctors and families face when
clinically evaluating brain function and
prognosis in the minimally conscious
patient.
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